INTRODUCTION
Constant risk aversion means that adding the same constant to all outcomes of two distributions, or multiplying all their outcomes by the same positive constant, will not change the preference relation between them. Within the expected utility framework, this assumption implies expected value maximization. But there are many (non-expected utility) functionals that satisfy this requirement, for example, the dual theory of Yaari [30] , or functions offered by Roberts [23] and by Smorodinsky [27] (see Example 1 in Section 2 below).
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In this paper we prove several representation theorems, where constant risk aversion is combined with some other known axioms to imply specific functional forms. We first show that non-trivial (that is, non-expected value) functionals that satisfy constant risk aversion cannot be Fre chet differentiable. This differentiability is the key assumption in Machina's analysis [19] , and is widely used in the decision theoretic literature. Since they are not Fre chet differentiable, constant risk aversion functionals cannot be approximated (in the L 1 norm) by expected utility preferences. These results are presented in Section 3.
A possible relaxation of Fre chet differentiability is the requirement that representation functionals are only Ga^teaux differentiable. This requires the derivative with respect to : of V((1&:) F+:G ) to exist, and to be continuous and linear in G&F. Many constant risk aversion functionals satisfy this assumption, but as we show in Section 4, adding betweenness to the list of axioms (FtG implies :F+(1&:) GtF for all : # [0, 1]) permits only one functional form, which is Gul's disappointment aversion theory [16] with a linear utility function u. According to this theory, the decision maker evaluates outcomes that are better than the certainty equivalent of a lottery by using an expected utility functional with a utility function u. He similarly evaluates outcomes that are worse than the certainty equivalent (with the same function u). Finally, the value of a lottery is a weighted sum of these two evaluations. In this theory, the certainty equivalent serves as a natural reference point, to which Gul's axioms make an explicit reference. Our axioms do not require any such explicit dependency, and the reference point is obtained as part of the results of the model, rather than as part of its assumptions.
One of the most popular alternatives to expected utility is the rank dependent model, given by V(F )= u(x) dg(F(x)). (This model has several different versions, see Weymark [29] , Quiggin [21] , and other citations in Section 5 below.) This functional form is consistent with constant risk aversion whenever u is a linear function, which is Yaari's dual theory [30] . Although many axiomatizations of the rank dependent model exist, 1 they all depend on one crucial assumption, namely, that the value of an outcome depends on its relative position. This is of course a key feature of the rank dependent model, from which its name is derived. But it would be nice to be able to obtain this property as a result, rather than as an assumption of the model. In Section 5 we offer an axiomatization of a nontrivial special case of Yaari's functional, where none of the axioms makes an explicit appeal to the relative position of any of the outcomes. The key added axiom is mixture symmetry, which states that if FtG, then for all : # [0, 1], :F+(1&:) Gt(1&:) F+:G (see Chew, Epstein, and Segal 20 SAFRA AND SEGAL [7] ). The functional form we obtain is a weighted average of the expected value functional, and the Gini inequality index.
Two recent works on bargaining with non-expected utility preferences make use of homogeneity of preferences with respect to probabilities (see Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson [24] and Grant and Kajii [14] ). We offer a slightly stronger assumption, where FtG iff for every : # [0, 1], :F+(1&:) $ 0 t:G+(1&:) $ 0 ($ 0 is the distribution of the degenerate lottery that yields the outcome zero with probability one). Together with constant risk aversion, this axiom implies Yaari's representation with a probability transformation function of the form g( p)=1&(1& p) t . We prove this result in the last section of the paper.
DEFINITIONS
Let 0=(S, 7, P) be a measure space and let X be the set of real bounded random variables with non-negative outcomes on it. For X # X, let F X be the distribution function of X. Denote by F the set of distribution functions obtained from elements of X. With a slight abuse of notations, we denote by a the constant random variable with the value a, and its distribution function by $ a . For X # X, let X be the lowest possible value of X (that is, X is the supremum of the values of x for which F X (x)=0). Observe that for X # X and a>&X , X+a # X, and the distribution F X+a is given by F X+a (x)=F X (x&a). Throughout the paper, when we use the notation X+a or F+a we assume that a>&X . Also, for X # X and *>0, *X # X, and we define the distribution *_F X :=F *X by (*_F X )(x)=F X (xÂ*).
On X we assume the existence of a complete and transitive preference relation p. We assume throughout the paper that if F X =F Y , then XtY. Therefore, p induces an order on F, which we also denote p. Assume further that p is continuous (with respect to the weak topology), and monotonic (with respect to first order stochastic dominance). It then follows that every F # F has a unique certainty equivalent x # [0, ), satisfying Ft$ x (recall that for every F # F there exists x such that F(x)=1). We restrict attention to preference relations satisfying the following assumption.
Constant Risk Aversion. X p Y iff for every a>max[&X , &Y ] and for every *>0, *(X+a) p *(Y+a). Or equivalently, Fp G iff for every such a and *, *_(F+a) p *_(G+a).
Note that p satisfies constant risk aversion if it satisfies both constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion. Also, its representation functional V: F Ä R which is defined implicitly by Ft$ V(F ) (that is, V(F ) is the certainty equivalent of F), satisfies V(*_(F+a))= *[V(F)+a]. In such a case we say that V satisfies constant risk aversion. The following are examples for such functionals.
for some functional W, where + F is the expected value of F and _ F is its standard deviation (Roberts [23] ).
(3) V(F )=arg min t |x&t| c+1 dF(x) for some c>0 (Smorodinsky [27] ).
The next lemma shows that the set of functionals satisfying constant risk aversion is much larger than the above list. Moreover, from two such functionals more functionals can be created. Lemma 1. Let V be the set of all functionals that satisfy constant risk aversion. Then for every V$ V, the functionals V 1 and V 2 are in V, where
Proof. For a given F, there is a sequence
. The proof of the sup case is similar. K
SMOOTH PREFERENCES
Machina [19] introduced the concept of smooth representations, that is, representations that are Fre chet differentiable. Definition 1. The function V: F Ä R is Fre chet differentiable if for every F # F there exists a``local utility'' function u( }; F ): R Ä R such that for every G # F,
In other words, V is Fre chet differentiable if for every F, the functional V behaves around F like an expected utility representation with the von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function u( }; F ). Machina [19] demonstrated how under this assumption, many results in decision theory can be extended to non-expected utility models. Obviously, if V(F ) always equals E[F ], the expected value of F, then V is smooth and satisfies constant risk aversion. But we have seen above that many other functionals satisfy constant risk aversion. It is therefore natural to ask whether any of them is Fre chet differentiable. Theorem 1. The following two conditions are equivalent.
(2) V satisfies constant risk aversion and is Fre chet differentiable.
Proof. Obviously, (1) O (2). To see why (2) O (1), consider first the family of local utilities u( }; $ x ). Since local utility functions are unique up to scalar addition, 2 we assume that for every x, u(x; $ x )=x. Consider now the lottery ( y, p; 1, 1& p) for arbitrary y and p. Using the local utility u( }; $ 1 ) we obtain (recall that u(1;
Similarly, for ( y+:, p; 1+:, 1& p) we obtain
By constant risk aversion, the left hand sides of Eqs. (2) and (3) Set x= y+: and k=1+:, and obtain for x k&1,
Similarly to Eq. Divide both sides of the last equation by p, and then take the limit as p Ä 0 to obtain u(*y; $ * )=*u( y; $ 1 ).
Set x=*y and k=* to obtain for x k&1,
Let h( } )=u( }; $ 1 ) and obtain from Eqs. (4) and (6) h(x&k+1)+k&1=kh
Since h is increasing, it is almost everywhere differentiable. Pick a point x*>1 at which h$ exists. Differentiate both sides of Eq. (7) and obtain that for x=kx*,
Since x*>1, it follows that h$(z) is constant for z>1.
By similar arguments, there is x*<1 at which h is differentiable. We now obtain that h is differentiable on (0, 1), and that its derivative there is constant. In other words, there are two numbers, s and t such that
From Eq. (6) it now follows that
Claim 1. Let V be a Fre chet differentiable functional, and let u( }; $ x* ) be its local utility at $ x* . Then for almost all x*, u(x; $ x* ) is differentiable with respect to its first argument at x=x*.
Proof of Claim 1. By monotonicity, the functional V satisfies
x>y, hence the set of points where V($ x )Â x does not exist is of measure zero. The claim now follows from the equivalence of the following two conditions.
(1) The derivative V($ x )Â x exists at x=x*.
(2) The local utility u(x; $ x* ) is differentiable with respect to its first argument at x=x*.
To see why (1) and (2) are equivalent, note that
Divide both sides by = and let = Ä 0 to obtain that V($ x ) is differentiable with respect to x at x=x* iff u(x; $ x* ) is differentiable with respect to its first argument at x=x*. K Since V is Fre chet differentiable, 3 it follows from Claim 1 that for almost all k, u( }; $ k ) is differentiable with respect to the first argument at k. Hence in Eq. (8), s=t, and since V($ k )=k, it follows that u(x; $ k )=sx+ (1&s) k.
Fix the probabilities p 1 , ..., p n , and consider the space of lotteries (x 1 , p 1 ; ...; x n , p n ). These lotteries can be represented as vectors of the form (x 1 , ..., x n ) # R n . For y 0, let d y =( y, ..., y) be the point on the main diagonal corresponding to the lottery $ y . Pick a point x* not on the main diagonal of R n and y such that x*t$ y , and let H* be the two dimensional plane containing x* and the main diagonal. It follows from Roberts [23, p. 430] that indifference curves on H* below the main diagonal are linear and parallel to each other, and so are indifference curves above the main diagonal. In other words, x*td y iff for all : # [0, 1], :x*+(1&:) d y td y . Note that this mixture is with respect to outcomes, not with respect to distributions.
The local utility function at $ y is given by u(x; $ y )=sx+(1&s) y, hence
Divide by :s, and then let : Ä 0 to obtain n i=1 p i x i *= y, which is the expected value functional. By continuity, V(F ) is the expected value functional for all F. K Following this result, Chambers and Quiggin [3] proved that, assuming differentiability, decreasing absolute risk aversion implies increasing relative risk aversion.
BETWEENNESS AND GA TEAUX DIFFERENTIABILITY
The last section suggests that in the presence of constant risk aversion, the assumption of Fre chet differentiability is too strong. Weaker notions of differentiability exist, and at least one of them got special attention in the literature.
exists and if $V(F, G&F ) is a continuous linear function of G&F. V is Ga^teaux differentiable if it is Ga^teaux differentiable at F for every F.
If V is Fre chet differentiable, then it is also Ga^teaux differentiable, but the opposite is not true. For example, the rank dependent model is Ga^teaux, but not Fre chet differentiable (see Chew, Karni, and Safra [8] ). 4 In this section we assume that preferences can be represented by Ga^teaux differentiable functionals, and that they satisfy the following betweenness assumption.
Betweenness. Fp G implies that for every : [4, 5] and Dekel [9] ).
We say that the functional V satisfies betweenness if V(F ) V(G ) implies that for every :
In this section we characterize functionals that satisfy constant risk aversion, Ga^teaux differentiability, and betweenness. It turns out that the only functional to satisfy these three axioms is a special case of Gul [16] disappointment aversion theory (which by itself is a special case of Chew's semi-weighted utility theory [5] ).
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SAFRA AND SEGAL 4 The minimum of two Ga^teaux differentiable functionals is not necessarily Ga^teaux differentiable. Suppose that for :
Definition 3. V is a Disappointment Aversion functional (see Gul [16] ) if it is given by
where : is the probability that F yields an outcome above its certainty equivalent C(F ), and #(:)=:Â[1+(1&:) ;] for some number ;.
According to disappointment aversion theory, the decision maker evaluates outcomes that are better than the certainty equivalent of a lottery by using an expected utility functional with a utility function u. He similarly evaluates outcomes that are worse than the certainty equivalent. Finally, the value of a lottery is a weighted sum of these two evaluations.
Theorem 2. The following two conditions are equivalent.
(1) V is Ga^teaux differentiable, and satisfies constant risk aversion and betweenness.
(2) V is a disappointment aversion functional with the linear utility u(x)=x.
Proof. If V satisfies betweenness, then each of its indifference curves can be obtained from an expected utility functional. Assuming as before that for every k, V($ k )=k, it follows that there are utility functions
Choose k>m>0, and let (x, p; 0, 1& p)t(k, 1). Then (mxÂk, p; 0, 1& p) t(m, 1). By Eq. (10), pu k (x)=k and pu m (mxÂk)=m, hence
Let
That is, F k, m consists of those distributions whose certainty equivalent is k, and whose lowest outcome is not less than k&m. On F k, m the preference relation p satisfies u k (x) dF=k and u m (x&k+m) dF=m, or equivalently, u m (x&k+m) dF+k&m=k. The reason is that Ft$ k iff F&k+mt$ m . Consider the two expected utility preferences on [F: F(k&m)=0] that are represented by u k (x) dF(x) and v(x) dF(x), where v(x)=u m (x&k+m)+k&m. Since they share an indifference curve (the one that goes through $ k ), they are the same, hence
Together with Eq. (11), this implies
Let y=x&k+m and obtain
We want to show that %=1.
Since V is Ga^teaux differentiable, it follows from the proof of Theorem 1 (see Footnote 3) that
x>m.
For y{m we obtain
But m+(mÂk)( y&m) # ( y, m) (or # (m, y)), hence %=1. This is the case of disappointment aversion theory, where u(x)=x and ;=(sÂt)&1.
In the Appendix we show that disappointment aversion function with linear utility function u is Ga^teaux differentiable. K Theorem 2 strongly depends on the assumption that the functional is Ga^teaux differentiable. For a functional that satisfies betweenness and is not disappointment aversion (and therefore, by Theorem 2, is not Ga^teaux differentiable), see Example 1(3), which is taken from Smorodinsky [27] .
In disappointment aversion theory, the certainty equivalent of a lottery serves as a natural reference point, which Gul's axioms explicitly use. Our axioms do not refer to any special point, and the reference point is obtained as part of the results of the model, rather than as part of its assumptions, even if only for a special case of this theory.
MIXTURE SYMMETRY
As mentioned in the Introduction, Yaari's dual theory [30] , given by V(F )= x dg(F(x)), satisfies constant risk aversion. This functional is a special case of the rank dependent model, V(F)= u(x) dg(F(x)) where the utility function u: R + Ä R and the probability transformation function g: [0, 1] Ä [0, 1] are strictly monotonic, g(0)=0 and g (1)=1 (see Weymark [29] and Quiggin [21] ). This family of functionals received many different axiomatizations (e.g., Chew and Epstein [6] , Segal [26] , Quiggin and Wakker [22] , Wakker [28] and Fishburn and Luce [12] ), but all these axiomatizations make use of the order of the outcomes. For example, Quiggin's axiom 4 of [21] implies expected utility if non-ordered outcomes are allowed.
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Since rank dependent functionals evaluate outcomes not only by their value, but also by their relative rank as compared to other possible outcomes, axioms that presuppose attitudes that are based on outcomes' relative rank are arguably less convincing than axioms that do not make an explicit appeal to such ranks. The aim of this section is to offer what we believe to be the first axiomatization of a non-trivial set of rank dependent functionals where none of the axioms refers to the order of the outcomes, or treats an outcome differently based on its rank. We will use the following terms. Similarly to betweenness, these definitions can be extended to the functional V. The next lemma shows that quasi concavityÂbetweennessÂquasi convexity along one indifference curve implies global quasi concavityÂ betweennessÂquasi convexity. Formally, Since all outcomes are non-negative, Ft$ 0 implies F=$ 0 , hence the lemma. K Theorem 3. The following two conditions on p are equivalent.
(1) It satisfies constant risk aversion, non-betweenness, and mixture symmetry.
(2) It can be represented by a rank dependent functional with linear utility (that is, Yaari 's dual theory functional [30] ) and quadratic probability transformation function of the form g( p)= p+cp&cp 2 for some c # [&1, 0) _ (0, 1].
Proof. Obviously, (2) implies (1), so we show that (1) implies (2) . As is proved in [7] , mixture symmetry implies that the domain of p can be divided into three regions A, B, and C, A oB o C, such that on B, p satisfies betweenness, on A and on C, p can be represented by (not necessarily the same) quadratic functional of the form
where . l is symmetric, l=A, C. Moreover, V is quasi concave on A and quasi convex on C. By Lemma 2, only one of the three regions is not empty, and by the nonbetweenness assumption, V is quadratic throughout. In other words, p can be represented by a strictly quadratic function i j p i p j .(x i , x j ). Define a function v:
For *>0, v(*x, p)=*v(x, p). So for a fixed p the function v is homogeneous of degree 1, hence
Assume without loss of generality that .(0, 0)=0. Let q(x) :=.(x, x) and r(x) :=.(x, 0), hence q(0)=0. Then from Eqs. (13) and (14) it follows that
In Lemma 3 below we prove that the two functions q and \ are trice differentiable. Differentiate both sides three times with respect to p to obtain
Since this equation holds for every x, it follows that all the coefficients of x on the right-hand side of Eq. (17) are zero. In particular, \$$$( p) q$(x\( p))#0. By monotonicity, q$>0, hence \ is quadratic. Since by Eq. (14), \(0)=0 and \(1)=1, it follows that
Also, [ \$] 3 q$$$#0. Since \ is not constant, it follows that q$$$#0, hence q is quadratic. In other words, together with the assumption that q(0)=0, we obtain
From Eqs. (14) and (15) it follows that (x, p; 0, 1& p)t( \( p) x, 1). By constant absolute risk aversion we obtain for every x> y
Substitute Eq. (18) into this last equality to obtain
Comparing the coefficients of powers of p on both sides of this last equation we get for p 4 0=ac
2 (x& y) 2 .
Hence either a=0 or c=0. Suppose first that c=0, then \( p)= p.
Comparing the coefficients of p 2 in Eq. (20) we obtain
It follows from Eq. (13) that for X(x 1 , p 1 ; ...; x n , p n ),
hence V is an expected value functional, but this contradicts the nonbetweenness assumption.
On the other hand, if c{0 and a=0, then by Eq. (19), b{0. By comparing the coefficients of p 2 in Eq. (20) we get for x> y
Similarly, for y>x,
By the monotonicity of . we may assume, without loss of generality, that b=1. We thus obtain that
.(x, y)= 
The functions q and p of the proof of Theorem 3 are trice differentiable.
Proof. By monotonicity, both q and p are increasing functions, hence almost everywhere differentiable. The left hand side of Eq. (16) is always differentiable with respect to p, hence so is the right hand side of this equation. Suppose \ is not differentiable at p*. Since q is almost everywhere differentiable, there is x such that q is differentiable at x\( p*), a contradiction. Since \ is differentiable, it follows by the differentiability of the left hand side of Eq. (16) that so is q. Differentiating both sides of Eq. (16) with respect to p we thus obtain
The right-hand side of Eq. (16) is differentiable with respect to x, and since q is differentiable, so is r. It follows that the left-hand side of Eq. (22) is differentiable with respect to x, hence so is the right-hand side of this equation, in other words, q" exists. Since \ is differentiable, q$( \( p))Â p exists, and since the left-hand side of Eq. (22) is differentiable with respect to p, so must be \$( p). In other words, \ is twice differentiable. Differentiating both sides of Eq. (22) with respect to p we obtain
Similarly to the above analysis, since both sides of Eq. (23) are differentiable with respect to x, q$$$ exists, and since both sides are differentiable with respect to p, \$$$ exists. K Since betweenness implies mixture symmetry, and since preferences satisfy either betweenness or non-betweenness, Theorems 2 and 3 imply the following corollary. (1) The preferences p satisfy constant risk aversion and mixture symmetry, and V is a Ga^teaux differentiable functional.
(2) The preferences p can be represented either by Gul 's disappointment aversion functional with the linear utility u(x)=x or by a dual theory functional with a quadratic probability transformation function of the form g( p)= p+cp&cp 2 for some c
, where gÄ ( p)= p 2 , and when c=1, V(F X )= x dg*(F X (x)), which is the Gini measure of income inequality. Since \( p) is monotonic (see Eq. (15)), it follows by Eq. (18) that c # [&1, 1]. Since g* is concave it represents risk aversion (see Yaari [30] and Chew, Karni, and Safra [8] ), hence x dg*(F(x))<E[F X ]. In other words, the Gini measure is the lower bound of all the monotonic functionals that satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 3.
ZERO INDEPENDENCE Suppose
FtG. What will be the relation between qF+(1&q) $ 0 and qG+(1&q) $ 0 ? Some existing empirical evidence suggests that if x> y>0 and (x, p; 0, 1& p)t( y, 1), then (x, qp; 0, 1&qp) o ( y, q; 0, 1&q) (this is called the common ratio effect see Allais [2] , MacCrimmon and Larsson [18] , or Kahneman and Tversky [17] ). Assuming the rank dependent model, Segal [25, 26] connected this effect to the elasticity of the probability transformation function g, and showed that if qFtG iff F+(1&q) $ 0 t qG+(1&q) $ 0 for all F and G with two outcomes at most, then g( p)=1& (1& p) t for some t>0. Stronger results were achieved by Grant and Kajii [15] , who proved the same for a wider set of initially possible functionals. They assume that preferences can be represented by a measure of the epigraphs of cumulative distribution functions, 6 and that if F(z)=G(z)=1, then Fp G implies that for all q # (0, 1), qF+(1&q) $ z pqG+(1&q) $ z . In this section we prove that to a certain extent, it is enough to assume constant risk aversion (although in that case the utility function will have to be linear). The formal assumption we use is the following.
Slightly weaker assumptions were introduced by Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson [24] , and later by Grant and Kajii [14] , for the derivation of a preference-based Nash bargaining solution that applies to generalized expected utility preferences. The outcome of zero is considered there to be the disagreement outcome (the outcome that the bargainers receive if they fail to reach an agreement). In [24] the similar assumption is called homogeneity and it requires that zero independence should hold for G=$ x . In [14] it is called weak homogeneity and it requires that zero independence should hold for G=$ x and for F= p $ y +(1& p) $ 0 . These assumptions play a crucial role in establishing the existence and the uniqueness of the ordinal Nash solution.
To prove Theorem 4 we will modify a result from Gilboa and Schmeidler [13] and assume that preferences satisfy diversification (see below). As in Section 2, let 0=(S, 7, P ) be a measure space and let X be the set of all measurable bounded random variables on it.
Diversification. Let X, Y # X. If XtY, then :X+(1&:) Y p X for all 0<:<1. Equivalently, for G, H # F, if GtH, then for all X and Y such that G=F X and H=F Y , and for all 0<:<1, F :X+(1&:) Y p G.
Lemma 4. The following two conditions are equivalent.
(1) V satisfies constant risk aversion and diversification.
(2) There exists a unique set T of increasing, concave, and onto functions over [0, 1] such that p can be represented by
Proof. Clearly (2) implies (1) (see Lemma 1 in Section 2 above), so we prove here that (1) implies (2) . First note that for each X # X with certainty equivalent x, the set [Y: Y pX ] is a convex cone with a vertex at x. The reason is that for Xtx, constant risk aversion implies that for all : 0, :X+(1&:) xtx, and diversification implies convexity of upper sets. Constant risk aversion also implies that all these cones are parallel shifts of each other.
The conditions in (1) imply the axioms of Gilboa and Schmeidler [13] . These authors discuss preference relations over a set of``horse-lotteries'' that is, acts with subjective probabilities whose consequences are (possibly degenerate) roulette lotteries. They show, in their Theorem 1 and Proposition 4.1, that a preference relation satisfies their axioms if, and only if, it can be represented as a minimum over a family of subjective expected utility functionals. Translated into our framework, their results imply the existence of a compact set C of finitely additive measures on 0 such that
denote the distribution function of X with respect to the measure Q (F P X is denoted by F X , as before) and let V:
The following claim explains the relationship between the measures in C and the given probability measure P.
Claim 2. Every Q # C is absolutely continuous with respect to P. That is, for all Q and E/S, P(E )=0 O Q(E )=0. On the other hand, for z w,
Proof of Claim
On the other hand,
Hence [5&q; 5&(qÂ2)] p [4; 5], a contradiction. K Claim 2 implies that, for all X, Q, z 1 , and z 2 ,
Consider now a given X # X and a measure Q # C, and define a function
where l is the piece-wise linear function, defined on the complement of the image of F X , that makes g Q, X continuous. By the claim, g Q, X is well defined. Clearly, it is onto and non-decreasing, and it satisfies z dF
(that is, the set of all random variables that are comonotone with X ). Restricted to Com(X ), indifference sets of z dg Z (F Y (z)) are hyperplanes in X. Therefore, for Y # Com(X ),
Next, we discuss the case of non-comonotone random variables. Define W*:
By definition, W*(F X ) V(F X ). Suppose there exists X such that W*(F X )= x~<x=V(F X ). Then there exists X Â Com(X ) such that W*(F X )= z dg X (F X (z)). Let X 9 n be the set of all random variables Y # X that have at most n different outcomes y 1 } } } y n and satisfy Pr(Y= y i )=1Ân. Assume first that there exist n and X such that X, X # X 9 n and F x =F X . Clearly, Q(X )=Q(X ). Therefore, g X = g X , which implies W*(F X )=V(F X ).
If there is no such n then, by continuity, there exists n large enough for which there exist X n , X n # X 9 n that satisfy W*(F X n )= z dg X n(F X n(z ))< x~+1Â2(x&x~) and V(F X n )>x~+1Â2(x&x~), contradiction. Hence, for
It remains to show that the functions g Z are concave. Assume, without loss of generality, that there exist n and X # int(X 9 n ) such that, for some
Let Q=Q(X ) and denote q i =Q(X=x i ). By definition, g X (iÂn)= i j=1 q j . Therefore, q i 0 <q i 0 +1 . Take =>0 small enough and consider X(=) # int(X 9 n ) with the values x 1 < } } } <x i 0 &=<x i 0 +1 +=< } } } <x n . By the construction of Q, X(=) o X. This, however, contradicts risk aversion (note that risk aversion is implied by diversification, see Dekel [10] ). K Theorem 4. The following two conditions on p are equivalent.
(1) It satisfies constant risk aversion, diversification, and zero independence.
(2) It can be represented by V(F)= x dg(F(x), where g( p)=1& (1& p) t for some t 1.
Proof. Obviously (2) O (1). We prove that (1) O (2) for finite lotteries (that is, for lotteries with a finite number of different outcomes) by induction on the number of the nonzero outcomes. Continuity is then used to get the desired representation for all F # F.
By Lemma 4 there is a family of probability transformation functions [g : : : # A] such that for every F, V(F )=min : x dg : (F(x) ). For lotteries of the form (x, p; 0, 1& p) we obtain
Define f : ( p)=1& g : (1& p) and h( p)=min : f : ( p) and obtain that V(x, p; 0, 1& p)=xh( p).
By zero independence, (x, p; 0, 1& p)t$ y implies for all q # [0, 1], (x, pq; 0, 1& pq)t( y, q; 0, 1&q), hence xh( p)= y and xh( pq)= yh(q). Combining the two we obtain h( pq)=h( p) h(q).
The solution of this functional equation is h( p)= p
t (see Acze l [1, p. 41]). Suppose we have already proved that for lotteries with at most n prizes
We will now prove it for n+1. Let x 1 } } } x n+1 , and consider the lottery X=(x 1 , p 1 ; ...; x n+1 , p n+1 ). By constant risk aversion, V(F X )=x 1 +V(F X &x 1 )=x 1 +V(0, p 1 ; ...; x n+1 &x 1 , p n+1 ).
By continuity there is y such that F X &x 1 t( y, 1& p i ; 0, p 1 ). By zero independence F X* t$ y , where X*= \ In this appendix we prove that the disappointment aversion with linear utility is Ga^teaux differentiable. In our case, we assume that V($ k )=k. Therefore, for fixed s and t, the value of V at F is the number k that solves the implicit equation 
We compute next the derivative of J with respect to k. We need only the derivative at :=0, in which case H : =F. Therefore, the derivative of J with respect to k at :=0 is given by Obviously, this expression is continuous in G&F and also linear in G&F. K
